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This paper analyzes interest margin determinants in the Russian banking sector with a particular 
emphasis on the bank ownership structure. Using a unique bank-level data covering Russia’s entire 
banking sector for the 1999−2007 period, we find that the impact of a number of commonly used 
determinants such as market structure, credit risk, liquidity risk and size of operations differs across 
state-controlled, domestic-private and foreign-owned banks. At the same time, the influence of op-
erational costs and bank risk aversion is homogeneous across ownership groups. The results overall 
suggest the form of bank ownership needs to be considered when analyzing interest margin deter-
minants. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään korkomarginaaleihin vaikuttavia tekijöitä Venäjän pankkisektorilla 
ottaen erityisesti huomioon pankkien omistusrakenne. Analyysissä käytettään vuosien 1999 ja 2007 
välistä laajaa tilastoaineistoa Venäjän pankkisektorilta. Tulokseksi saadaan, että tavallisten tekijöi-
den, kuten markkinarakenteen, luottoriskin, likviditeettiriskin ja pankin koon, vaikutus vaihtelee 
valtiopankkien, kotimaisten yksityispankkien ja ulkomaisten pankkien välillä. Operatiivisten kus-
tannuksien vaikutus on homogeeninen kaikissa omistusryhmissä. Tulokset osoittavat, että pankkien 
omistus on otettava huomioon korkomarginaalien määräytymisen tutkimuksessa. 
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1  Introduction  
 
In modern finance, banks play a crucial role in the process of financial intermediation. This holds 
especially true for transition countries, where financial systems tend to be bank-based (Berglof and 
Bolton, 2002). Not surprisingly, banks play a dominant, and increasingly important role in financial 
intermediation in Russia. The ratio of banking-sector assets to GDP nearly doubled between 2000 
and 2007, exceeded 60% as of end-2007 (Central Bank of Russia, 2008). The growth in bank credit 
extended to the private sector as a share of GDP exhibited a similar pattern during this period.  
Given this expansionary trend of bank participation in the reallocation of financial re-
sources, it seems reasonable to consider the costs and efficiencies of banks in providing intermedia-
tion services. As state-controlled banks dominate Russian banking and foreign-owned banks play 
relatively minor roles, we might also ask how bank ownership structures affect costs of financial 
intermediation. To address these questions, we analyze bank net interest margin (a commonly used 
measure of efficiency of financial intermediation) and its determinants in Russia. We investigate the 
determinants of bank interest margins to see if they differ when bank ownership is taken into ac-
count. 
In general, the analysis of interest margins and interpretation of their level contains a trade-
off. On the one hand, high margins create impediments for the deepening of financial intermedia-
tion as lower deposit rates discourage savings flow into bank deposits and high lending rates reduce 
investment opportunities of banks. In emerging economies with poorly developed capital markets, 
both firms and individuals often have nowhere else to turn besides bank loans to raise money, 
which, in turn, may even hinder growth (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). Moreover, high margins 
may indicate problems in the regulatory banking environment and information asymmetry. On the 
other hand, higher margins can improve profitability of the banking system, strengthen bank capi-
talization and solidify its financial position by creating additional buffers against negative shocks 
(Barajas et al., 2000). 
In this paper, we test the importance of bank interest margin determinants suggested by the 
dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and its extensions modified for the Russian case. We 
follow the empirical literature on determinants of bank interest margins that investigates European 
banks (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004), Latin Ameri-
can countries (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) as well as emerging markets in Europe (Claeys and 
Vander Vennet, 2008; Schwaiger and Liebeg, 2008; Horváth, 2009). We extend previous studies by Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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paying special attention to the role of bank ownership in determining interest rate margins. Russian 
banking sector, where state control is still significant and the role of foreign banks modest
1
Our sample is subdivided into three parts according to the bank ownership structure. To 
this end, we differentiate among three types of banks: state-controlled, domestic private and foreign. 
We subdivide the sample according to bank ownership structure to examine variations in the impact 
of interest margin determinants across ownership structures. While Russia has been included in sev-
eral cross-country bank interest margin studies, it has not been investigated separately in a way that 
takes specific ownership structures of banks into account. Moreover, the previous studies used 
fairly restricted samples of Russian banks available in international databases. Here, we utilize a 
rich dataset containing quarterly data covering the whole banking sector in Russia. Our findings 
lend support to the hypothesis that the impact of certain interest margin determinants differs by 
bank ownership. 
, pro-
vides an interesting case to investigate this issue.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews selected literature. Section 3 
describes data, specification of the empirical model and methodology. Section 4 provides estimation 
results and robustness checks. The last section concludes.  
 
 
2  Review of select literature on interest margin determinants  
 
Contemporary models employed in the literature for the analysis of interest margin determinants are 
based on the dealership model proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981). Under this model, banks are 
assumed to be risk-averse intermediators in the financial market, collecting deposits and granting 
loans. An important factor influencing the size of the bank margin in this model is transaction un-
certainty due to asymmetric arrival time of the supply of deposits and demand for loans. Another 
factor driving the margin is market structure; due to the relatively inelastic demand for loans and 
supply of deposits, banks choose to exercise their market power and set higher margins. 
The main criticism of the initial model proposed by Ho and Saunders is its failure to rec-
ognize the bank as a firm having a certain production function associated with provision of the in-
termediation services (Lerner, 1981). The presence of cost inefficiencies associated with the pro-
                                                 
1 The state controls about half of the banking sector’s total assets in Russia. The number of foreign-owned banks in-
creased from 174 in 2000 to 221 at the end of 2008, at which time they accounted for about 28% of banking sector capi-
tal.  
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duction process across banks can have a distortionary effect on the margin. The extension of the 
basic dealership model by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) responds to this criticism by 
explicitly incorporating the role of operating costs and providing a detailed description of the link 
between riskiness and the margin. This model specifically differentiates between market risk and 
credit risk, as well as their interaction as separate factors affecting the margin.  
Although the theoretical evolution of the model has been straightforward, empirical verifi-
cation remains a challenge. To begin with, the data available to the researchers usually covers banks 
located in different countries with different institutional and environmental characteristics. This 
complicates comparison of the effects of various determinants across countries. For instance, there 
is great variation in factors such as financial taxation (level of reserve requirements), opportunity 
costs for reserves, bank capitalization and fragmentation of the market. This is true even for EU 
member countries, which have undertaken considerable measures to harmonize their regulatory, 
legal and institutional systems (Ruthenberg and Elias, 1996). To deal with this variation, some em-
pirical studies apply a two-stage approach that isolates impacts of various imperfections not taken 
into account in the theoretical model before modelling the remaining “pure spread” as a function of 
the theoretically motivated factors (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).  
Empirical studies of interest margin determinants applied to the developed countries gen-
erally support the theoretical predictions of the model (see Appendix). Margins have been found to 
be positively related to the degree of market concentration in European banking sectors (Saunders 
and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004), the US (Angbanzo, 1997) and 
Australia (McShane and Sharpe, 1995; Williams, 2007). There is also consensus among these stud-
ies as to the positive impact of operational costs confronting banks, suggesting that the technologi-
cal regime of the bank plays important role in its pricing strategy. However, there are also some no-
table contradictory results. For example, Williams (2007), who finds a negative relationship be-
tween credit risk and interest margin in Australia, interprets this finding as evidence that banks are 
unable to accurately price credit risk. 
The empirical outcomes for developing countries are more controversial. Brock and Rojas-
Suarez (2000) point out a need for caution in directly applying methods developed to study interest 
margins in industrialized countries to developing countries. More specifically, results can be mis-
leading when applied to the countries, where financial markets have yet to be deregulated. For this 
reason, worldwide studies of determinants of bank interest margins (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2000; Claessens et al., 2001) go beyond the framework of the dealership model. Using data on Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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banks from 80 countries for 1988-1995, the researchers consider a wide range of potential factors 
driving international differences in bank interest margins, including macroeconomic conditions, ex-
plicit and implicit bank taxation, deposit insurance regulation, overall financial structure, legal and 
institutional indicators.   
In general, the empirical evidence suggests that the level of interest margins in developing 
economies is persistently higher than in developed economies. Using data on Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) banks that included Russia, Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) attribute these dif-
ferences to low efficiency and low degree of market competition in these developing countries. 
Barajas et al. (2000) also note the role of financial liberalization in improving market competition 
and enhancing banking sector efficiencies in the case of Colombia that led to lower interest margins 
and better financial intermediation. 
One variable that could influence margins substantially, yet is not captured by the dealer-
ship model, is the ownership structure of the bank. Micco et al. (2007) show that the form of bank 
ownership has strong influence on bank performance in developing economies, while its impact is 
weaker in industrial countries. The dealership model assumes that, regardless of their ownership, 
banks apply similar business strategies and are exposed to a similar set of interest margin determi-
nants. This assumption appears inappropriate for transition countries, which experienced a surge of 
foreign bank entry during the transition process.
2
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) find that foreign banks realize higher margins than 
domestic banks in developing countries. The opposite conclusion holds for the developed countries, 
in which domestic banks realize higher interest margin. In a follow-up study, Claessens et al. (2001) 
investigate the impact of foreign bank entry (change in foreign bank presence) on the performance 
of domestic banks using a similar worldwide sample. They find that foreign bank entry improves 
domestic bank profitability, which they attribute to improved banking efficiency following the entry 
of foreign players. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) show that foreign banks in Latin American 
countries exhibit lower interest margins than domestic banks. The negative impact of foreign bank 
presence on the margin is also shown to work indirectly through its impact on administrative costs. 
Similar evidence is reported in Drakos (2003) for CEE countries (although Russia is not included in 
this study). In contrast, Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier (2007) find no direct relationship between 
 To overcome this, some studies augment the em-
pirical specification obtained from the dealership model by introducing dummy variables to capture 
the impact of bank ownership on the margin.  
                                                 
2 In a recent theoretical study, Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) show that foreign bank entry may affect domestic banking 
markets via two channels: spillovers and competition. In their model, foreign bank entry has implications for banking 
efficiency, which is an important determinant driving the interest margin.  
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the presence of foreign banks and interest margin in Armenia. Schwaiger and Liebeg (2008), using 
a sample of eleven CEE countries, show that foreign banks charge higher interest margins than do-
mestic banks. They attribute this to the relatively low refinancing costs of foreign banks in CEE 
countries as these banks have access to cheaper funds from parent banks based in developed coun-
tries.  
The above discussion suggests that determinants and impacts of bank interest margins vary 
considerably in emerging markets and bank ownership plays an important role. Previous studies ac-
count for the impact of bank ownership by including ownership dummy variables. This assumes 
that the impact of interest margin determinants is the same across banks with different ownership 
structures and that the differences arise from varying intercepts. In this study, we relax this assump-
tion and assume that both intercepts and slope coefficients may vary across banks with different 
ownership structures.  
 
 
3  Methodology and data 
 
3.1   Methodology 
 
We use a fixed effects estimator to evaluate the impact of various determinants on bank interest 
margins in Russian banks characterized by different ownership structures.
3
 
 Our empirical specifica-
tion takes the form: 
, 2 1
6 5 4 3 2 1
it time seas
it it it it it it i it
D D
LIQ LA CR CAP PER HERF NIM
ε γ γ
β β β β β β α
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
 
 
where indices i and t stand for bank and quarter, respectively, NIMit is the net interest margin for 
bank i in period t, αi is the fixed effects intercept and εit is the i.i.d. error term. The seasonal and 
time-specific variation in the interest margin is captured by the dummy variables DSEAS and DTIME, 
respectively.  
                                                 
3 The Hausman test gives preference to the fixed effect estimator when compared to a different panel estimator, the ran-
dom effect model. Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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Following earlier studies, we define net interest margin (NIM) as interest income minus in-
terest expenses divided by total assets. We consider six main determinants of bank interest margins 
that are motivated by the dealership model (Ho and Saunders, 1981) and are in line with previous 
empirical studies on determinants of bank interest margins. HERF (Herfindahl index) captures the 
market structure in the Russian banking sector. The index is calculated for 81 regions in Russia, 
with bank regional affiliations based on the location of their headquarters. The Herfindahl index is 
defined as the sum of squares of individual bank asset shares in the total banking sector assets for a 
given region. As higher market concentration is likely to contribute to higher margins, the estimated 
coefficient in our model is expected to have a positive sign.  
PER is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. This measure captures the impact of 
operational costs on the margin. Banks that incur high operational costs tend to transfer these costs 
to their customers by increasing interest margins, so the estimated coefficient is expected to be posi-
tive. Following Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) 
is used as a proxy for bank risk aversion. As equity is more costly than deposits, a higher proportion 
of equity in total assets indicates greater risk aversion and is expected to be reflected as higher mar-
gins. As a result, the estimated coefficient for CAP is expected to be positive. CR measures the 
credit risk faced by individual banks, and is proxied by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
loans. Banks with higher ratio of nonperforming loans face higher credit risk, which is likely to be 
reflected in the charging of higher margins.
4
LA is the logarithm of total assets, included as a proxy for the size of operations. The theo-
retical model predicts a positive relationship between the size of operations and margins, since for a 
given value of credit and market risk larger operations are expected to be connected to a higher po-
tential loss. On the other hand, economies of scale suggest that banks that provide more loans 
should benefit from their size and have lower margins. Therefore, we do not have a particular prior 
regarding the expected sign of this coefficient. Finally, LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to demand 
liabilities, proxying the liquidity risk faced by banks. The more the demand liabilities of the bank 
are backed up by liquid assets, the lower the liquidity risk of the bank and its margins. Table 1 pro-
vides description summaries of the individual variables, as well as the anticipated sign of their im-




                                                 
4 Note that causality can also run in the other direction. To control for a possible endogeneity problem, we use lagged 
explanatory variables as a robustness check.  
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   Table 1  Variable description and expected impact on the bank interest margin 




Net interest margin  NIM  interest income minus interest ex-
penses divided by total assets  0.019  0.013    
Herfindahl index  HERF  regional Herfindahl index for assets  0.208  0.145  + 
Personnel costs  PER  personnel expenses to total assets  0.010  0.008  + 
Capitalization  CAP  ratio of equity to total assets   0.278  0.178  + 
Nonperf. loans  CR  ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
loans  0.020  0.039  + 
Size  LA  logarithm of total assets  5.971  1.923  ? 
Liquidity ratio  LIQ  ratio of liquid assets to demand liabili-
ties  1.067  1.184   -  
 
3.2  Data 
 
Our dataset covers all banks operating in Russia during the period 1999 − 2007. It consists of the 
quarterly balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of banks. The sources of the data are the finan-
cial information agency Interfax and the Central Bank of Russia (CBR).5
Our dataset has three major advantages over the panels used in previous studies. First, it 
covers the whole banking sector and, thus, unlike the Bankscope dataset widely employed in previ-
ous studies, is not subject to a selection bias.
 To avoid the direct effects 
of the 1998 financial crisis, we start our sample period in 1999. The data constitute an unbalanced 
panel, because there were banks entering and leaving the market due to mergers or failures. We 
clean the data first by excluding the observations for which the loans to assets ratio is lower than 
5%. Moreover, for each of the explanatory variables, we account for potential outliers by dropping 
1 percentile from both tails. 
6
 
 Second, the data have quarterly, not yearly, fre-
quency. Finally, the dataset contains detailed information on bank ownership structure coming from 
the CBR, which allows us to divide the total sample into three subsamples composed of state-
controlled, private domestic and foreign-owned banks.  
                                                 
5 For more detailed description of the data, see Karas and Schoors (2005). 
6 A commonly used source of data in these studies is the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk, which covers only a 
selected number of banks in each country. For the period our dataset covers, there are about 2,600 bank-year observa-
tions in the Bankscope database. Our sample has more than double that number of bank-year observations.  Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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 Table 2  Descriptive statistics of the net interest margins 
  Mean  Median  Std. deviation  NOB 
1999  0.023  0.020  0.021  2915 
2000  0.020  0.017  0.018  4162 
2001  0.020  0.019  0.014  4410 
2002  0.020  0.018  0.013  4295 
2003  0.018  0.016  0.012  4635 
2004  0.017  0.016  0.010  4605 
2005  0.017  0.016  0.009  4525 
2006  0.016  0.015  0.008  3004 
2007  0.015  0.014  0.007  901 
   Note: Data for 2007 concern only the first quarter. 
 
 
The first insight is that margins overall decreased during the observation period from 2.3% in 1999 
to 1.5% in 2007 (see Table 2). Moreover, volatility declined. Taken together, this indicates that the 
process of financial intermediation became less costly to society as a whole. 
The trends for the most common interest margin determinants during the observation pe-
riod suggest they had an important impact on margins. Specifically, risk aversion measured by the 
capitalization ratio exhibits a downward trend, which suggests falling risk aversion may have con-
tributed to the declining pattern of the interest margins in Russia. At the same time, the size of 
banks and liquidity risk rise during the period under consideration, and operational expenses fluctu-
ate around the same level. Credit risk measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
declines in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, but then remains constant during 2002−2007. Market 
concentration of the banking sector does not change much in the 1999−2005 period, although it 
does increase slightly towards the end of the period. 
Net interest margins further differ by ownership groups (see Table 3). On average, margins 
are the lowest for foreign-owned banks. The average margins for private and state-controlled do-
mestic banks do not significantly differ. If we consider interest margin a proxy for efficiency of fi-
nancial intermediation, this ordering of banks is broadly in line with the finding concerning bank 
efficiency in Russia. Karas, Schoors and Weill (2009) find that in Russia foreign banks are most 
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 Table 3  Average interest margins by ownership groups 
   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  Average 
State-controlled  0.026  0.023  0.024  0.021  0.016  0.016  0.015  0.013  0.013  0.0187 
Foreign-owned  0.017  0.012  0.012  0.011  0.012  0.013  0.013  0.014  0.013  0.0128 
Domestic private  0.023  0.020  0.020  0.020  0.018  0.017  0.017  0.016  0.015  0.0185 
 Note: Data for 2007 only cover the first quarter. 
 
Decomposition of bank interest income and expenditures by sources of origin provides further in-
sights into the importance of bank ownership for the business models employed by banks (see Table 
4). The table shows that foreign clients are still very important for foreign-owned banks, accounting 
for almost half of the interest expenditures. On the asset side, the share of involvement of foreign 
banks in operations with foreign clients has decreased over time.  
Similarly, state-controlled banks were heavily involved in operations with public clients in 
the late 1990s, but thereafter this source of income declined significantly. State-controlled banks 
also redirected their activities to funding domestic clients as former public enterprises were privat-
ized. Of course, this client base continues to retain close ties with state-controlled banks.  
Domestic private banks work mostly with domestic clients. The shares of income and ex-
penditure coming from government clients were larger at the beginning of 1990s than at the end of 
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Table 4  Decomposition of bank interest income and expenditures  by counterparties 
 














Foreign-owned banks         
1999  37.72  2.60  58.40  49.32  0.05  50.63 
2000  39.35  1.44  58.47  44.05  0.67  53.87 
2001  35.65  2.36  59.00  49.58  1.09  49.33 
2002  24.43  2.18  70.10  36.63  0.35  62.73 
2003  22.72  1.71  72.94  49.34  0.18  50.49 
2004  16.50  2.48  78.82  54.58  0.08  44.35 
2005  15.89  2.15  79.61  57.26  0.19  41.77 
2006  13.31  1.12  83.25  48.36  0.44  51.18 
State-controlled banks         
1999  7.51  19.86  63.57  8.62  8.00  80.35 
2000  8.50  15.52  71.14  5.35  11.02  81.18 
2001  7.03  14.40  72.79  7.99  16.16  75.03 
2002  2.18  13.69  75.58  6.14  16.02  76.51 
2003  2.75  11.38  81.68  7.57  13.97  78.45 
2004  2.19  8.96  82.85  5.53  11.53  82.94 
2005  1.83  7.21  88.06  5.95  9.47  84.45 
2006  3.07  4.53  89.34  11.17  9.07  79.55 
Domestic private banks         
1999  2.47  8.38  78.16  1.94  4.09  89.59 
2000  3.17  7.24  82.18  2.05  4.17  89.68 
2001  3.05  6.10  84.26  3.25  5.31  88.57 
2002  1.21  5.71  82.01  3.60  4.35  88.66 
2003  1.09  4.63  83.90  3.61  3.51  90.52 
2004  0.97  3.67  86.38  3.59  2.79  91.35 
2005  1.19  2.69  90.76  4.08  2.12  91.99 
2006  1.56  2.09  92.18  4.05  1.76  93.97 
Note: foreign clients = foreign banks and foreign non-banking firms; public clients = federal government, bank of Rus-
sia, and firms owned by federal and local governments; domestic clients = domestic banks, domestic non-bank firms, 
and individuals. 
 
This descriptive analysis overall suggests that the development of interest margins, their 
determinants, as well as the sources of bank interest income and expenditures, exhibited different 
tendencies for different subgroups of banks. The following section analyzes the quantitative impact 
of these variables on the interest margin by the means of regression analysis. We evaluate how the 
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4  Results 
 
This section presents results of our estimations. First, we provide the results for the whole sample. 
We then do separate estimations by ownership groups and show our robustness checks. 
 
4.1   Baseline results 
 
In line with the previous literature, we first estimate the model using a sample of all Russian banks, 
regardless of ownership. The results of our estimations presented in Table 5 enable us to check 
whether determinants of the bank interest margins in Russia differ from the ones observed in devel-
oped countries as well as other emerging markets. 
 
 Table 5  Estimation results for all banks 










Herfindahl index  -0.001      -0.0002     
Personnel expenses  0.620  ***  0.0051  0.625  ***  0.0053 
Capitalization  0.007  ***  0.0012  0.010  ***  0.0015 
Nonperforming loans  -0.007  ***  -0.0003  -0.015  ***  -0.0006 
Total assets (log)  -0.001  ***  -0.0011  -0.0002    -0.0004 
Liquid assets to demand liabilities  -0.001  ***  -0.0006  -0.001  ***  -0.0006 
Obs.  33452  18159 
R
2 (overall)  0.2373  0.2579 
R
2 (within)  0.1478  0.2299 
Note: We report estimated coefficients and their significance (*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * signifi-
cant at 10% level). Seasonal and yearly dummy variables, as well as constant term, are included but not reported. Economic 
significance is measured by the impact of one standard deviation change. 
 
The first column reports estimation results for the baseline specification and the entire 
sample of Russian banks. All estimated coefficients, with the exception of the one concerning the 
Herfindahl index, are significant. This finding suggests that the dealership model rather well de-
scribes interest margin determinants for the Russian banking sector as a whole. On the other hand, 
our finding that interest margins in Russia are not affected by changes in the market structure con-
tradicts earlier studies for developed economies (see summary table in the Appendix) and the pre-Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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dictions of the theoretical model (which predicts a coefficient with a positive sign). Looking at the 
larger picture, we see results for emerging economies are generally mixed and not always signifi-
cant. Thus, our results for Russia are in line with findings of studies on other emerging economies. 
An insignificant coefficient for market structure might indicate that regional concentration in the 
Russian banking sector did not change substantially over the observation period. Indeed, even today 
there are a few major players in the market, so changes in the rest of the banking system are likely 
insufficient to have much influence on the overall structure of the market. 
The second part of Table 5 provides estimation results for the sample that excludes banks 
located in Moscow. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the entire sample, 
suggesting that the aforementioned relationship between interest margins and their determinants in 
Russia is not driven by large banks concentrated in Moscow (both in asset size and sample size) and 
can thus be generalized for the other Russian regions. 
Next, as suggested by the theoretical model, we find that operational costs incurred by 
banks are transmitted to their clients through higher margins charged for their financial services. In 
line with the theoretical prediction, the impact of operational costs is positive and most sizable in 
economic terms among the margin determinants. This corresponds to the previous research on both 
developed and emerging economies. 
Another result corresponding to the previous findings is the positive significant coefficient 
for capitalization ratio, which indicates that banks with higher risk aversion tend to set higher mar-
gins. The economic impact of this variable measured by the response to a one standard deviation 
change is quite sizable: it has the second largest impact following personnel expenses. Very similar 
is also the economic significance of bank’s size of operations. In line with Maudos and Fernandez 
de Guevara (2004), size of operations measured by the logarithm of total assets confirms the pres-
ence of economies of scale as larger banks tend to have lower margins. The estimated coefficient 
for liquidity risk is significant and negative as is the case in the previous studies that use similar 
definition of this variable to measure liquidity risk. 
Finally, the estimated coefficient for credit risk is negative, which contradicts most find-
ings in the literature. However, unlike earlier studies that proxy credit risk by the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total loans, we employ the now-preferred ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. 
The negative sign we get can thus be explained using the market discipline argument for Russia 
(Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2008). Following this argument, depositors require a higher premium for 
depositing their savings in riskier banks (i.e. banks with higher non-performing loan ratios). An in- 
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crease in deposit rates ceteris paribus would contribute to the decline in interest margins, establish-
ing a negative relationship between non-performing loans and the margin. 
 
4.2  Estimation results by ownership 
 
As mentioned, sources of interest income and expenditures differ by bank ownership. Thus, differ-
ent bank owners have different incentives, and consequently different strategies, when setting mar-
gins. Domestic and foreign banks may also respond differently to the increase in credit risk created 
by moral hazard. State-controlled banks in Russia control the lion’s share of the market and expect 
to be bailed out by the state when they encounter problems. Similarly, the cost inefficiencies of 
state-controlled banks are, as a rule, less likely to translate into increased margins than in the case of 
domestic private  and foreign banks, because state-controlled banks tend to participate in social pro-
jects and public enterprise lending. Moreover, foreign-owned banks, backed by their parents abroad, 
must also compete aggressively to gain market share. For these banks, risk aversion might not be as 
significant as for domestic private banks which have considerably higher capitalization ratios. 
Unlike domestic private banks, the majority of the state-controlled and foreign banks have access to 
the interbank market, which makes liquidity risk less crucial for these banks. 
The fact that determinants of bank interest margins might differ by bank ownership has not 
been properly investigated in the literature so far. It was only accounted for by introducing a 
dummy variable for ownership and the assumption has been that the impact of interest margin de-
terminants (slope coefficients) is the same across banks with different ownership structure, the only 
difference coming from varying intercepts. However, our detailed data enables us to investigate 
whether both intercept and slope coefficients differ when ownership is taken into account.  
For this purpose, we estimate three models, one for each ownership structure, to capture 
differences in the impact of interest margin determinants for state-controlled, domestic private and 
foreign-owned banks. State-controlled banks are defined using the list provided in Vernikov (2007). 
The bank is considered to be foreign-owned, if more than 50% of its stake is owned by a foreign 
entity. We use information from the Central Bank of Russia to identify these banks. The remaining 
banks are defined as domestic private.  
Table 6, which summarizes estimation results for banks in each ownership group, shows 
that the coefficient for personnel expenses and capitalization are consistent across all ownership 
groups. This finding is in line with previous studies and implies that all banks respond similarly to Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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changes in operational costs when setting the interest margin. The same holds true for capitalization 
ratio; banks’ risk aversion is positively reflected in their margins. 
 
Table 6  Estimation results by bank ownership 
  














HERF  -0.005    -0.001  0.048  ***  0.003  -0.001    -0.0001 
PER  0.859  ***  0.007  0.323  ***  0.002  0.616  ***  0.005 
CAP  0.011  ***  0.001  0.007  **  0.001  0.007  ***  0.001 
CR  0.014    0.001  0.007    0.000  -0.008  ***  -0.0003 
LA  0.001    0.002  0.002  ***  0.004  -0.001  ***  -0.001 
LIQ  3.5E-05     3.6E-05  -0.0004  ***  -0.001  -0.001  ***  -0.001 
Obs.  913  857  31708 
R
2  0.4734  0.0159  0.2306 
Note: We report estimated coefficients and their significance (***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% 
level). Seasonal and y early dummy variables, as well as constant term, are included but not reported. Economic significance is 
measured by the impact of one standard deviation change. 
 
Foreign-owned banks differ from the other banks in two respects. First, only margins of foreign-
owned banks are affected by changes in market structure. The sign of the estimated coefficient is 
positive, which corresponds to previous studies. The economic significance is higher than the sig-
nificance of operational costs (the most important for other subgroups and the banking sector in 
general). This result indicates that foreign-owned banks exploit their unique position in the market 
and positive public perception by charging higher margins in more concentrated regions. On the 
other hand, despite their large market share state-controlled banks do not appear to fully exploit 
their market power when setting interest margins. 
The second distinctive feature of foreign-owned banks is the positive and significant coef-
ficient for the size of operations, indicating that larger foreign-owned banks charge higher margins. 
Considering economic significance, this coefficient is the most important for foreign-owned banks. 
It is also necessary to bear in mind that the measure of size is related to the market share of the in-
dividual bank in Russia. Thus, this result could be connected to the finding of higher margins, espe-
cially in the case of larger foreign-owned banks able to exploit their unique position in the market. 
On the other hand, the impact of the size of operations is negative for domestic private banks, sug-
gesting that scale economies play a more prominent role in setting interest margins by these banks 
than potential losses per unit of operation (see the discussion of Table 1). In their attempt to expand  
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their presence in the market, domestic private banks might be tempted to decrease the margins as 
soon as they start to benefit from the economies of scale. 
We find a significant impact of credit risk only for domestic private banks. As with the re-
sults for the entire sample, the sign of the estimated coefficient is negative, which is in line with the 
findings of Williams (2007), who reports negative association between credit risk and interest mar-
gins for Australian banks. With the exception of the market discipline explanation mentioned 
above, the negative sign could also imply that these banks do a poor job of controlling for credit 
risk when setting their margins. It could also indicate a more aggressive strategy on the part of do-
mestic private banks fighting for the market share and thus willing to accept higher credit risk with-
out raising their margins. 
Liquidity risk is a significant determinant of bank interest margins for foreign-owned and 
private domestic banks. As expected, the impact of liquidity risk is negative. For state-controlled 
banks, liquidity does not play a role as it may well be that they can rely on state intervention in the 
event of liquidity problems. Moreover, most of these banks have access to the interbank market. 
The differences between banking groups may further indicate that these banks are involved in dif-
ferent type of operations. 
Overall, our results suggest that there exist substantial differences in terms of the impact of 
bank interest margin determinants across ownership groups. Results for the total sample presented 
in the previous section are largely driven by the sample of domestic private banks – the most nu-
merous group of banks in Russia. Even so, state-controlled banks still hold a substantial part of 
banking sector assets. Therefore, disregarding the ownership structure might lead to erroneous con-
clusions regarding the impact of interest margin determinants in Russia. 
 
4.3  Robustness checks 
 
In this subsection, we summarize the series of robustness checks on our baseline specification. 
There is a possible problem of simultaneity between the dependent and explanatory variables as are 
generated using current indicators from income statement and balance sheet of banks. We provide a 
solution to this problem by using lagged values for the explanatory variables. Table 7 summarizes 
the estimation results.  
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Table 7  Robustness check − lagged values of explanatory variables 














HERF  -0.009    -0.002  0.059  ***  0.003  -4.9E-05    -6.9E-06 
PER  0.565  ***  0.004  0.255  ***  0.002  0.457  ***  0.004 
CAP  0.010  ***  0.001  0.008  **  0.001  0.006  ***  0.001 
CR  0.032  ***  0.001  0.008    0.0003  -0.008  ***  0.000 
LA  0.001    0.002  0.003  ***  0.004  -0.001  ***  -0.002 
LIQ  -0.0005     -0.0005  -0.001  ***  -0.001  -0.001  ***  -0.001 
Obs.  853  770  29090 
R
2  0.2585  0.0087  0.2153 
Note: We report estimated coefficients and their significance (***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% 
level). Seasonal and yearly dummy variables , as well as constant term, are included but not reported. 
 
Estimated coefficients and their significance correspond to the main results reported in the previous 
section. The sole exception is the coefficient accounting for the credit risk of state-controlled banks, 
which becomes significant with one period lag. Its sign is positive, indicating that state-controlled 
banks belatedly account for credit risk when setting margins. 
In the second robustness check we use an alternative measure of market concentration. It is 
measured by the share of the three largest banks’ assets in the total bank assets in a given region. 
Estimation results reported in Table 8 confirm that the results obtained for the baseline model re-
main valid. 
 
Table 8  Robustness check – alternative definition of market concentration 
  















SHARE  -0.010    -0.002  0.030  **  0.003  -0.001    -0.0002 
PER  0.860  ***  0.007  0.344  *  0.002  0.616  ***  0.005 
CAP  0.012  ***  0.001  0.007  **  0.001  0.007  ***  0.001 
CR  0.015    0.001  0.005    0.0002  -0.008  ***  -0.0003 
LA  0.001    0.002  0.002  ***  0.004  -0.001  ***  -0.001 
LIQ  0.0001     0.0001  -0.0004  ***  -0.001  -0.001  ***  -0.0006 
Obs.  913  857  31708 
R
2  0.3865  0.0188  0.2286 
Note: We report estimated coefficients and their significance (***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  
*significant at 10% level). Seasonal and yearly dummy variables , as well as constant term, are included but not reported.  
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Finally, we employ alternative definition of foreign-owned banks. In the baseline model 
we consider a foreign-owned bank to be the one with majority (i.e. more than 50%) foreign owner-
ship. For the purpose of this robustness check a foreign-owned bank is a bank with foreign owner-
ship share higher than 20%. This provides us with 35 more banks in the foreign-owned subgroup.  
 
Table 9  Robustness check – alternative definition of foreign-owned banks 














HERF  -0.005    -0.001  0.016  *  0.001  -8.7E-04    -0.0001 
PER  0.859  ***  0.007  0.349  ***  0.003  0.619  ***  0.005 
CAP  0.011  ***  0.001  0.007  ***  0.001  0.007  ***  0.001 
CR  0.014    0.001  0.009    0.000  -0.009  ***  -0.0004 
LA  0.001    0.002  0.002  ***  0.003  -0.001  ***  -0.001 
LIQ  3.5E-05     3.6E-05  -0.0004  **  -0.001  -0.001  ***  -0.001 
Obs.  913  1279  31298 
R
2  0.4734  0.0414  0.2316 
Note: We report estimated coefficients and their significance (***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  
*significant at 10% level). Seasonal and yearly dummy variables , as well as constant term, are included but not reported. 
 
Table 9 presents our estimation results. Definition of the state-controlled banks did not change in 
this case. The results for the subgroup of private domestic banks as well as foreign-owned ones stay 
in line with the main results.  
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
This study provides the first evidence on the determinants of bank interest margins in Russia with a 
particular emphasis on the role of bank ownership. We find that the impact of the commonly used 
determinants in Russia is in line with the relevant literature for emerging markets. Unlike previous 
studies, which evaluate the impact of bank ownership by introducing dummy variables, we estimate 
separate regressions for banks with different ownership to allow for the impact of interest margin 
determinants to vary across different ownership structures. Our findings lend support to the hy-
pothesis that bank ownership moderates the impact of the theoretically motivated determinants of Zuzana Fungáčová and Tigran Poghosyan 
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the bank interest margin.  The obtained results emphasize the importance of the bank ownership 
structure and call for reassessment of previous empirical findings on interest margin determinants, 
especially for those panel data studies that include countries with significant variation in the bank-
ing sector ownership structures. 
We show that most of the traditional determinants of bank interest margins differ in their 
impact when considering ownership categories of banks. Robustness checks further corroborate 
these results. The impact of credit risk is only significant for domestic private banks. State-
controlled and foreign-owned banks do not seem to take the credit risk into account in their pricing 
strategy. Further results show that the estimated coefficient for the size of operations is significant 
for private domestic and foreign-owned banks, but foreign banks charge higher margins for more 
“weighty” operations to compensate for the higher risk associated with these operations. Domestic 
banks, on the other hand, charge lower margins for large-scale operations where they benefit from 
economies of scale.  
The impact of the market concentration (with the exception of foreign-owned banks) is in-
significant, which contrasts with previous findings for developed economies. This finding likely 
reflects the distinct characteristics of the Russian banking system. The estimated coefficient for for-
eign-owned banks is positive, which indicates that foreign-owned banks exploit their unique posi-
tion in the market and positive public perception by charging relatively higher margins in more 
concentrated regions.  
We also show that there are certain similarities across banks with different ownership 
structures. Significant and economically sizable impact of operational costs across all subgroups 
justifies the extension of the basic dealership model by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), 
which includes this important variable. Moreover, risk aversion has a significant and positive im-
pact for all ownership subgroups.  
The overall results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions and correspond to find-
ings obtained in other studies on interest margin determinants in emerging markets. Nevertheless, 
bank ownership plays an important role in emerging markets and should not be disregarded when 
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DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
Authors  Maudos and  
Fernandez de Guevara  Williams  Angbanzo  Saunders and  
Schumacher 
Carbo Valverde and  
Rodriguez Fernandez  Maudos and Solis 
Year  2004  2007  1997  2000  2007  2009 
Journal/Working paper  JBF  FMII  JBF  JIMF  JBF  JBF 
Market structure  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (?)  (+) 
Operating costs  (+)  (+)  N/A  N/A  (+)  (+) 
Risk aversion  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)/(?) 
Credit risk  (+)  (-)  (+)  N/A  (+)  (+) 
Size of operations  (-)  (?)  N/A  N/A  N/A  (+)/(?) 
Liquidity  (+)  (?)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (?) 
Foreign ownership  N/A  (-)  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Sample  France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, UK  Australia  USA 
Germany, Spain, 
France, UK, Italy, 
Switzerland, USA 
Germany, Spain, France, 
the Netherlands, Italy, UK, 
Sweden 
Mexico 




GLS  Cross-sectional OLS 
for each year 
Dynamic panel GMM 
estimator (Arellano-Bond) 
FE model / Dynamic 
panel GMM estimator 
(Arellano-Bond) 
  Note: (+), (-) and (?) indicate positive significant, negative significant and insignificant, respectively.  
 
 
 EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Authors  Dabla-Norris and 







Martinez Peria  
Mody 
Schwaiger and 
Liebeg  Horváth 




Working Paper  JPM  WB Policy 
Research Paper  ES  WB Econ 




Czech Journal of 
Economics and 
Finance 
Market structure  (+)  N/A  (-)  (?)  (?)  N/A  (+)  (+)  (?) 
Operating costs  (?)  N/A  (+)  N/A  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+) 
Risk aversion  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (?)  (?)  (+)  (-) 
Credit risk  N/A  (+)  (-)  (+) accession;  
(?) non-accession  (+)  N/A  (?)  (+)  (+) 
Size of operations  (?)  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  (?)  (-) 
Liquidity  (-)  (-)  (-)  N/A  (-)  (?)  (+)  N/A  N/A 
Foreign ownership  (?)  (-)  N/A 
foreign:  
(-) accession;  
(+) non-accession;  
state: mostly (?) 
accession;  
(-) non-accession 
(+)  (?)  (-)  foreign: (+), 
state: (?)  N/A 


















































Note: (+), (-) and (?) indicate positive significant, negative significant and insignificant, respectively. EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Authors  Dabla-Norris and 







Martinez Peria  
Mody 
Schwaiger and 
Liebeg  Horváth 




Working Paper  JPM  WB Policy 
Research Paper  ES  WB Econ 




Czech Journal of 
Economics and 
Finance 
Market structure  (+)  N/A  (-)  (?)  (?)  N/A  (+)  (+)  (?) 
Operating costs  (?)  N/A  (+)  N/A  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+) 
Risk aversion  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (?)  (?)  (+)  (-) 
Credit risk  N/A  (+)  (-)  (+) accession;  
(?) non-accession  (+)  N/A  (?)  (+)  (+) 
Size of operations  (?)  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  (?)  (-) 
Liquidity  (-)  (-)  (-)  N/A  (-)  (?)  (+)  N/A  N/A 
Foreign ownership  (?)  (-)  N/A 
foreign:  
(-) accession;  
(+) non-accession;  
state: mostly (?) 
accession;  
(-) non-accession 
(+)  (?)  (-)  foreign: (+), 
state: (?)  N/A 
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